The aim of this paper is to give an account of Wittgenstein's epistemological view in Philosophical Investigations (PI) in the context of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (PoS). PoS serves as a model structure through which the conception in PI of cognition is being gradually outlined. After the sketch of Wittgenstein's account of knowledge in On Certainty compared to Kant's epistemological conception and Hume's skeptical doubts, the sole examination of Hegel's PoS commences. First, I intend to deal with the problem of sense-certainty. It is argued that pure sensory experience without an intrusion of concept cannot grasp any particular object in apprehension. Second, I observe that Hegel's account of force and understanding introduces the theme of conceptuality. Wittgenstein is being examined simultaneously, on the background of the analysis of Hegel's dialectical course. It is concluded that both Hegelian and Wittgensteinian conception implies that any kind of knowledge requires some social basis, i.e. that cognition is possible only when language, or conceptuality and propositionality respectively, intervenes. The thesis is shorty compared to John McDowell's concept of how a human mind approaches the world. 
Introduction
Justified true belief has become one of the most attractive concepts of contemporary epistemologies. Yet we find some older but nonetheless demanding theories among such old panthers among who Hegel or Wittgenstein count as. What they brought to the modern epistemological heritage is something that I shall be calling social structure of cognition.
In the final section, that I wish to give the main space in my speech to, the concept of justified true belief is redefined in accord with the argumentation, i.e. the term justified true belief is to be defined as a socially based concept, while sociality is an indispensable element of human cognition.
It shall be argued that common basis of communicated beliefs is necessary in order to establish certain criteria of truth and justifiedness. Instead of transcendentalism and idealism, or contrarily, any Hume-like empirical theory, it is the social ground that represents a solution of what the cognitive theories, further mentioned, are not able to solve.
vocabulary that shall be used and criticized in relation to Wittgenstein's and Hegel's writings.
The most basic concept is justifiedness and belief, i.e. the concept of justified (true) belief. If the term of belief implies that for example whenever one undergoes some pain, one also has a belief that they feel the pain, the consequences are shocking, for under this notion the only creature able to feel pain would be a human, while all other kinds of living beings, such as animals, would be deprived of having such a property, because, presumably, only language users can have beliefs. In the following sections, the term belief shall serve only as basic concept of cognition, for it shall enable us to understand particular examples without overusing the term cognition.
Robert Audi, while introducing the concept of justified true belief, emphasizes that justification is not any kind of process in which controversial beliefs are being justified, but rather a property of some beliefs being justified. These beliefs are those usually considered to be true as well, for imagining someone saying that their belief is justified but not true suggests a misunderstanding of the term justified. Of course it is plausible that one can have a justified belief that turns out to be false. Edmund L. Gettier presupposes in his famous paper "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?," 2 that one can have a justified false belief. It is certainly open for debate though. Nevertheless, people will usually think their justified beliefs are also true, unless (and until) at a later time someone points out that their belief is false, or else their evidence changes, in which case they will drop the belief but perhaps say their belief was justified before they found out it was false. Therefore, when someone believes a belief to be justified, they also believe the belief to be true. Moreover, having certain belief also implies that the believer possesses some justification for their belief; e.g. when one believes that the field is green, they also possess some kind of acquaintance with the field under which the field is characterized as being green.
To hold a justified belief implies that one also knows they justifiedly believe something to be true. Thus much of what one justifiedly believes they also know. There are several kinds of knowing something, e.g. the so-called self-knowledge according to
Audi suggests that when someone is imaging something, for instance a green field, they know simultaneously that they believe they are imagining the object, the green field that Audi's view, and perhaps the most common view in contemporary epistemology, definitely favors perception as major source of any kind of knowledge.
There are four basic components of knowing: (1) the perceiver; (2) the object perceived;
(3) the sensory experience; (4) the relation between the object and the subject, usually comprehended as causally established. There are also three basic approaches or viewpoints of how to speak about perception. First, it is simply the approach concerned with the sole set of what can be perceived. Second, it is the focus on what people perceive the object to be. Third, it is the concern with the facts one might be acquainted with through perception, i.e. with the propositional character of knowledge based on perception. To illustrate this as a process, one may proceed as follows: (i) I see a green field; (ii) I see the field to be rectangular; (iii) I see that the field is rectangular. From this example speaking for all sorts of perception is clear that the seeing would be marked as the basic source of perceptual knowledge. This is indeed true even when speaking about how the perceptual process of getting to know something is described in both Hegel's and Wittgenstein's; yet, one shall further see that this method of cognizing something proves to be insufficient after all.
All the three ways of treating an object through perception represent the basic ground for particular knowledge to be established. Though knowledge is terminologically used more often than cognition, cognition appears to be more accurate in terms of the objectives of this paper for its broader scope of the so-call process of acknowledging something.
Further on, one may distinguish between at least two, and two for the purposes of the future study of Hegel's dialectics sufficiently, kinds of belief. The first is marked by Audi as propositional, and refers directly to the proposition one makes about certain object. For example, when seeing a field, one may create a proposition saying the field is rectangular, with regard to the particular shape of the field. The second, let it be called with Audi an objectual belief, is the belief referring merely to the object itself.
Interestingly, though the objectual belief is presented as the second kind, it seems to be primordial in terms of not only perceptual apprehension of an object, but also in terms of an intellectual apprehension. yet as a sense-datum, as a mental image of a property of a certain object that is, but remains merely mentally presupposed and basically unaware. The object given is not even an object in a sense of a thing outside of human mind that may be experienced through sensory reflection and certain mental activity. The object will play an important part in the sole process of the subject evolving as consciousness at the first stage, and becoming self-consciousness at the second stage, i.e. opposing itself to itself and rediscovering itself through this opposition.
To summarize the first-stage, the so-called stage of sense-certainty, of an object, one may simply say the object represents a not-yet concept, described by Hegel as universal, i.e. as a mere being. Through perception, the second stage of the development of consciousness, that already works with the distinct properties of an object, the object as a potential concept reaches the status of particularity. Finally, the object becomes fully a concept because (and the condition here shall be crucial for further argumentation) the Master-Slave relation has reached the objective view
Thus the first problem that Hegel encounters in the chapter on sense-certainty concerns the immediate knowledge, or the immediateness as such. What is considered immediate for Hegel turns out to be mediated by an ostentatious return from the particular to the universal, i.e. immediate. The particular grasped as immediate is always negated by another particular, and the latter by another one, etc., ad infinitum.
The sense of an infinite regress, however, implies precisely that the immediate experience of an object is possible only under the condition of the existence of space and time.
The true, i.e. the real so to say, at the stage of sense-certainty, is the immediateness that has come about with the subject positing itself as opposed to the object. The subject and object becomes equal; the subject representing the certainty and the object representing the truth.
Truth, therefore, is first established as a sense-certainty, i.e. as an immediate knowledge
, not yet reasonable, as not yet conceptual. Sense-certainty, in terms of the concluding stage of spirit (the last and the highest form of the consciousness) shall be, however, understood as both the highest truth and the greatest error.
Why is this so? Because the knowledge of the immediate is the knowledge of being of something existing that is. It is an activity of mind referring to a mere "here is", or "now is", even though not yet articulated. The specific approach towards object, i.e. the mediation of the object as a substance through its properties, is, therefore, only possible in language.
A ticklish question arises while facing the puzzle of the content of sensecertainty. What is the content of knowledge, which the being of the object is not dependent on? Comparing the idea of pre-conceptual knowledge with Kantian intuition one may better understand what the nature of the pre-conceptual is. Both Wittgenstein and Hegel seem to be holding the same idea (with which I shall modestly sympathize):
that such knowledge is precisely the kind of knowledge that shows the child not only feels the pain, but also understands the pain as something, i.e. as something that is or is not the case. The pre-conceptual has to be understood as a spatio-temporal intuition in the Kantian sense. To stress the assumption of Wittgenstein's and Hegel's here, it is to be emphasized that there shall be some kind of pre-reasonable knowledge for grounding the sole possibility of one's becoming a speaking entity, i.e. an entity experiencing the world through concepts.
In PI, §31 and further Wittgenstein argues that to understand something in order to be capable of asking its name (i.e. its concept), one need to know what to do with the object enquired already. In §33 he adds that one should know, what characteristic of the object is meant to be pointed out. It seems, with regard to the paragraphs from §148 to §155 that summarize the issue of understanding, that the major problem with the ostensive method of identifying the object is its indefiniteness in terms of properties and the inseparability from its background. Both the criteria have been already discussed in the context of Hegel's account of object in the first chapter of the Phenomenology.
Regarding these criteria it is to be claimed that the ostensive method of identifying an object corresponds to Hegel's description of the knowledge of sense-certainty, and consequently, fails to become a satisfying knowledge of the world as such.
The linguistic problem in sense-certainty is that there cannot be formulated any judgment, since the stage on which the consciousness distinguishes one object from the other, i.e. is given the knowledge of properties, has not yet been reached. The second reason for which the stage of sense-certainty remains non-conceptual is that even if one was able to give a name of the object, the name as such will not be capable of standing for any reasonable proposition. The motivation for rejecting propositions consisting of a name only seems to be the same reason for which Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of understanding one-word propositions. For Wittgenstein there is no understanding of the proposition without the circumstances already given and understood, and without the other speaker sharing these circumstances and their understanding.
The next step in this paper is thus to give a taste of the situation of the subject being already established as self-consciousness, referring to the third chapter of Hegel's
Phenomenology called "Understanding", and encountering another subject in the dialog. Understanding is the stage of consciousness in which the social dimension of Hegel's dialectics functions at last, as it is grounded in the subject itself, and it provides the subject with the account of the world now open to the possibility of being shared within a group of subjects. Among more subjects the consciousness becomes selfconscious and for the first time enters the relations with other subjects that are, according to Hegel, proved to be necessary for the genesis of a concept. Making one last but most important remark on Hegel's three-fold dialectics in the first part of PoS, it shall be stressed that the social basis of understanding, i.e. the forces connecting the objects in the world into a meaningful framework within which any conceptual apprehension of the world is only possible, established, the first in need is to set up an argument that would deny the idea of private language ( § §243-315) as such. The object is here not defined as an object, but as a mere instantiation of the universal idea of yet an empty concept. In the stage of perception, the object is already established as an object, but the stage of conceptuality is only on the level of marking the objects apprehended. This is the stage of ostension, as Wittgenstein describes it. In the §257 Wittgenstein warns against the thought that by giving name to a particular object, the sense of the name is given simultaneously. When someone marks their feeling into the calendar, they actually made an empty sign. The sign fills itself with a particular sense only when it is justified by the understanding of other people ( § §261).
And these others would be precisely those sharing the same form of life. In this example is also well observable the impossibility to make a propositional belief here. 
Following master & slave
What the last section brought into the discussion was the phenomenon of rulefollowing. The most important observation is that precisely these rules were not possible until the subject became fully self-conscious, i.e. until the subject became recognized by another self-conscious subject. These rules are at the same time a necessary condition for the possibility of cognition. What happens socially, or what is required to happen socially in order to make cognition possible, is to be illuminated in the following pages. Indeed, once more Hegel needs to take his part here.
Tom Rockmore in his introductory words towards his chapter on Force and
Understanding in PoS expresses precisely what is the motivating delusion of this paper.
Perception, which cannot explain the unity of the perceptual object, bequeaths an unresolved dualism between sensation and perception. Empiricism founds knowledge on what is given in experience. Since the unity of the object necessary for a theory of knowledge cannot be explained solely within perception, empiricism of all kinds is forced beyond perception in order to explain it theoretically 5 .
This "beyond perception" shall in this paper be equated with the social. Hegel seems to shape his examination of consciousness in a similar way. Before explaining the most explicit reference in Hegel's, i.e. the Master & Slave relation, there is to be given several lines about the previous two chapters.
So as Kant, Hegel maintains that knowledge is grounded in experience, meaning in sensory apprehension. But both Hegel and Kant proceed towards another ground of knowledge. In Kant's CPR it is the a priori concept. In Hegel's, however, it is not anything in the self-conscious subject itself. In this sense Hegel seems to be a revolutionary, because what he means by this realm beyond the perceptual is the realm of the social.
At the stage of perception, the object is still unrecognized as a concept, i.e. as something on which the subject participates. Force is meant to dissociate the unity of the object in order to see the object as difference in unity and unity in difference. On the one hand, it is an important concept because it resolves the puzzle of how the world outside of human mind, and the world socially structured and somehow responding to the outer world cooperate. Rockmore suggests that the concept of force is similar to Kant's conception of cognition, which requires both the intuitions and the concepts, i.e.
both the sensory experience and the understanding forming the experience into a more or less coherent knowledge. On the other hand, if the force serves as the glue between the mind and the object apprehended, there emerges a question, whether this would lead to an infinite regress as in the problem of a third man, or whether the force represents the utmost basis of cognition.
Another crucial outcome of this chapter of PoS is the phenomenological turn from the object in-itself towards the object as represented in concept, or more precisely, to the subject as having the object in representation. It is not entirely clear, what the concept in Hegel's phenomenology means. It shall be more than a pure appearance of an object, but it is not yet an understanding in its full sense, i.e. in its propositional form.
Why is it important at this moment?
One may see that Wittgenstein made the similar phenomenological turn in PI. In this case, Wittgenstein shall for the purposes of this paper complete Hegel's attempt to dig out the fundamental out of the experientially shared. Under the urge of this objective, Hegel is forced to make another dialectical step from consciousness
[Bewutssein] to self-consciousness [Selbstbewusstsein] , for without the analysis of the latter no cognition can be comprehended. And for Hegel self-consciousness presupposes any social interaction.
It is suggested that the chapter on the Truth of Self-Certainty culminates in asserting that one may only become aware of oneself through active relations to the other. That is, knowledge as such is, as Rockemore puts it, "inherently social, since it centrally depends on the relation among individual human beings."
The conclusion, that the Master-Slave relation is fundamental for, reaching any kind of knowledge, has been formulated as a necessary condition. Now, the most interesting form of the relation would here be the form in which both the subjects are mutually recognized in the acknowledgement of one by the other. The triadic relation is reached when the relation between Master and Slave becomes mediated by their relation towards the object. The Master relates to the Slave through the object, here perhaps more appropriately the thing, and conversely the thing to the Slave, and vice versa.
To turn the discussion back to Wittgenstein and the general purpose of this study, the concept of objective view [objektiv Anschauung] , that has already been touched upon in the previous section, shall now be examined further. McDowell, who takes the concept of the outer conditions to be the crucial one to make rule-following possible.
McDowell commences his enquiry of the skeptical paradox in PI in the sphere of the conceptual. Whatever a particular language can embrace, has to lie within the language, and therefore, may be evaluated in terms of its justifiedness and truthfulness.
McDowell argues that though a belief formulated in a proposition may be comprehended in terms of its conceptuality, it could be misunderstood in terms of its content. This is, however, to be rejected for it has been shown, that the conceptual in We could not credit a subject with a capacity to use, say, the concept of pain in judgments of 'inner experience' if she did not understand how the circumstance that those judgments concern fits into the world at large. What that requires is that the subject must understand her being in pain as a particular case of a general type of state of affairs, someone's being in pain. So she must understand that the conceptual capacity drawn on in the relevant "inner experiences" is not restricted to its role in "inner experience" and judgments of 'inner experience': not restricted, that is, to its first-person present-tense role." [...] She understands that the very same circumstance is thinkable by someone else, or by herself at different times -otherwise than in a thought expressive of 'inner experience'. (McDowell, (37) (38) So meaning is not a mystery coming from outside of nature, but is integrated with nature by the social that ascribes it to particular objects and events in accord with the natural appearance of how things are.
Conclusion: justified true belief redefined
The paper went through approximately three stages of the process of cognizing an object, while the term object has been denoted in three different ways in accordance The second definition echoes the introductory section on the concept of justified true belief. Sensory evidence plays usually the key role when justifying certain belief. It has been suggested, however, that the key role may belong to testimony that is often taken as merely a second-order system of evidence. The question concerning the type of the subject has already been answered; in order to make a proposition that is to be justified, one always already needs the social background to be established, i.e. the type of the subject required is a subject sharing certain form oflife with other subjects. Not only justifiedness implies that a belief is consistent with the content of one or more complex belief(s), but it also implies that a belief is capable of being directly verified through the situational circumstances. These circumstances may consist of other people sharing certain language game, following thus certain rules, etc. The directness of the process of verification, or so-to-say justification, contrasts with the indirectness of complex beliefs. Now is shall be clear that Russell's terms of direct and indirect acquaintance has been alluded, and intentionally redefined, so that the difference between these two is not a difference between a belief or acquaintance acquired and verified through empirical experience, and a belief or acquaintance acquired and verified through testimony, anymore. In accordance with the re-definition offered, both the direct and indirect belief shall be understood as socially based and conditioned.
